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An Evolving Dialectic: Contesting Conceptions of Nature in American Ideas, from 






This essay explores one way of understanding how concepts of human nature and the natural world evolved during 
the course of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American philosophical thought. It traces changing conceptions 
of human nature in relation to the natural world through the respective philosophies of transcendentalism (as 
represented by Ralph Waldo Emerson), idealism (as represented by Josiah Royce), and pragmatism (as represented 
by John Dewey), with reference to environmental historian Donald Worster’s discussion of the “arcadian” and “imperial” 
intellectual traditions in his book Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas. It argues that Worster’s thesis 
regarding the dialectical relationship between these two traditions and the eventual ascendancy of the imperial 
perspective to predominance in American culture generally is also applicable to certain successive transformations that 
occurred in American philosophy specifically, as exemplified by Emerson, Royce, and Dewey. However, as Worster 
also suggests, although American history reflects this dialectical trend, none of its philosophical exemplars conform 
simplistically to either an arcadian or imperial ideology, and the arcadian-imperial dialectic should be regarded as only 
one limited — albeit illuminating — view of the intellectual tradition from the early nineteenth century through the 





Noted environmental historian Donald Worster’s landmark book, Nature’s Economy: A History of 
Ecological Ideas 1 makes an important distinction between two contrasting conceptions of the 
natural world and humanity’s place within it. These schools of thought (or, perhaps more 
accurately, frames of mind), “arcadian” and “imperial,” are important because the tensions and 
harmonies between them throughout American history have done much to shape the 
contemporary cultural/intellectual ethos in and from which environmentalists and policy-makers 
are presently thinking. This paper will examine the thematic trend in conceptions of nature 
presented by Worster, from the arcadian to the imperial (or “Linnaean” — hereafter the terms 
“imperial” and “Linnaean” will be used interchangeably), as expressed in three successive 
                                                 
1 Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The 
1994 edition followed the initial 1977 edition, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books). The 1994 edition remained the same as the original, except for the addition of two concluding chapters on the 
diversity of academic discourse in ecological thought from the post-war years to the present, and further reflections on 
the course of environmental history, which are referenced in this paper. 
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schools of American philosophical thought: transcendentalism as articulated by Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, idealism as articulated by Josiah Royce, and pragmatism as articulated by John Dewey. 
Specifically, it will assess the extent to which each of these thinkers conceived of humanity and 
nature from either an arcadian or an imperial perspective, as these terms are defined in Worster’s 
work.  
This paper will test whether and to what extent American philosophy and culture, as 
represented by these thinkers, evolved from an initially more arcadian view of nature to a 
relatively more imperial perspective, as Worster claims. An examination of Emerson’s 
transcendentalism, Royce’s idealism, and Dewey’s pragmatism in chronological succession, and 
within the historical context of their ideas, seems to reveal this trend at work in attitudes about 
the natural world, with Emerson representing a more arcadian approach, Royce a transitional 
one, and Dewey a more imperial one. While their ideas are obviously not simply reducible to 
Worster’s categories, viewing them within this framework can help to illuminate their respective 
multivalent, problematic, and sometimes dissonant conceptions of nature from a historical 
perspective. Since Worster’s thesis is well-known but little-examined in the literature, exploring 
this trend can add a dimension of insight to scholarship on environmental philosophy and 
history. 
In discussing “The Disorder of History” Worster concludes that:  
 
Historians of every sort can no longer claim that there is a single universal 
narrative of change that all species, all communities, all places must 
conform to. ‘History’ has given way to ‘histories’. Each needs the space in 
which to play itself out. That is precisely what modern conservation must 
aim to do: provide the space so that all the many earthly histories can 
coexist.2  
 
Only by acknowledging the diversity and holism, the discord and the harmony, in the ways that 
these historical narratives unfold, can we begin to appreciate their richness and depth. 
Constructing a kind of dialectical narrative that encompasses both arcadian and imperial views 
of the natural world, sometimes in tension and sometimes in unison — while understanding that 
this narrative is neither exclusive nor privileged, is always evolving, and never ultimately 
reconciles the dissonance between these views — provides a more accurate and subtle vision of 
American intellectual and environmental history than any universal or “single narrative of 
change” can. Indeed, this may be a particularly effective way to do justice to the changing 
subtleties and complexities of environmental philosophy and thought within the larger 
movement of American history. 
Other classic comprehensive treatments of environmental thought have sought to view its 
history from this perspective. For example, Roderick Nash’ Wilderness and the American Mind, Max 
Oelschslaeger’s The Idea of Wilderness, and Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden envision Western 
                                                 
2 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 433. 
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conceptions of nature in complex dialectical terms.3 Bob Pepperman Taylor also traces a similar 
strand of dialectical synthesis between what he calls the “pastoral” and the “progressive” 
traditions in American environmental political thought: he locates pastoral ideology (like 
Worster’s arcadian vision) in the tradition from Thoreau to deep ecology, and progressive 
ideology (like Worster’s imperial vision) in the tradition from Gifford Pinchot to environmental 
utilitarianism and pragmatism.4 Indeed, there is a direct personal and intellectual lineage from 
Emerson to William James to Dewey (Emerson being both godfather of and formative influence 
on James, who was then integral to Dewey’s development) that might actually represent a true 
Fichtean dialectic, with the zeitgeist of Emerson’s transcendentalism as the “thesis” generating 
James’ radical empiricism as “antithesis,” and culminating in Dewey’s later naturalism as the 
“synthesis.” 
Placing environmental thought within these kinds of historical narratives can highlight basic 
assumptions and over-arching paradigms that have configured the character of current ecology. 
Specifically, placing representative figures in the history of American philosophy within the 
context of Worster’s narrative offers enhanced possibilities for conceiving and re-conceiving the 
foundational role that each may have played in reflecting (or even shaping) the ethos of 
environmental thought from the early nineteenth century to the Progressive Era and now. 
 
Worster’s Concept of Arcadian vs. Imperial Worldviews 
 
Worster begins his inquiry into the “history of ecological ideas” by contrasting what he calls the 
arcadian conceptualization of nature (originating, in its modern form, largely in the writings of 
eighteenth-century naturalist and natural philosopher Gilbert White), with the imperial or 
Linnaean conceptualization (exemplified by the work of Francis Bacon and Carl von Linne or 
Linnaeus, the eighteenth-century biologist and founder of modern taxonomy in botany) which 
culminated in the “imperial ideology” of modern science. These two traditions differ from one 
another in several fundamental respects. One difference involves attitudes toward modern 
instrumental science as a cultural/intellectual institution and as a medium through which 
humanity relates to the natural world. The arcadian tradition has been critical of instrumental 
science, while the imperial tradition has embraced its methods and paradigms. Worster points 
out that although Gilbert White “was at times strongly utilitarian in his science. . . there was still 
another important element in White’s concept of ecology, one to which later generations 
particularly would respond with enthusiasm and delight, and that contrasts sharply with his 
more manipulative purposes. This element was the arcadian harmony with nature he found in 
his rural life.”5 The arcadian sense of “harmony” with nature inspired subsequent critiques of the 
Baconian-Newtonian paradigm and the culture of modernity configured by it. From poets such 
as Samuel Taylor Coleridge to philosopher-activists like John Muir, thinkers inspired by White’s 
                                                 
3 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Max Oelschlaeger, 
The Idea of Wilderness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology 
and the Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
4 Bob Taylor, Our Limits Transgressed: Environmental Political Thought in America (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 
1992). 
5 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 9. 
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arcadian vision criticized “both the industrial society and the new methods of scientific analysis. 
Narrow specialization, mathematical abstraction, and extensive reliance on elaborate instruments 
of measurement were all cited as causes for what was seen as the alienation of scientists — and 
mankind generally — from nature.”6 
This critical attitude by arcadian thinkers toward the influence of science upon humanity’s 
relationship with nature was combined with a sense of appreciation, even reverence, for those 
dimensions of living experience in the natural world which, they felt, the scientific mentality 
could never comprehend. Indeed, although American romantics tended to be more pragmatic in 
temperament than their European counterparts, they nonetheless shared a respect for the kind of 
vital experiences through which nature could be appreciated in a deeper way than could possibly 
be countenanced by the scientific method. Henry David Thoreau in particular remained skeptical 
toward science for most of his career, wary of the “self-centered and calculating” quality of 
“scientific opinion” even as he used it in his own environmental research. Even in his more 
“scientific” later writings, nature always retained a deep intrinsic dimension irreducible to 
scientific data.  
In stark contrast to this arcadian attitude, the imperial attitude was (and has been) one of 
unreserved enthusiasm for an imperial ideology in which the “equilibrium between man and 
nature . . . would be replaced by a more aggressively artificial, humanized landscape; a new world 
in which science would give mankind absolute power over the land and its creatures.” According 
to Worster, this view has its philosophical roots in Francis Bacon’s thought and has been the 
dominant influence upon western civilization’s paradigm since that time. Imperial thinkers 
“knew how to put every piece of nature in its precise place,” thus accommodating their 
metaphysics to the requirements of an increasingly “rational, pious, and bourgeois” modern 
cultural ideal. One consequence of this has been “a general indifference to natural life on the part 
of American society,” which has largely marginalized the arcadian attempt to highlight and 
revitalize mankind’s encounter with nature. The triumph of the imperial ethos in American 
culture generally has thus promoted the kind of “insensitivity toward living beings” 
characteristic of modern science in particular. Arcadian thought has sought to provide a counter-
point to this view of nature as inanimate data for scientific analysis.7  
  The arcadian tradition has assumed an intrinsic correspondence — even an identity — 
between nature and the human condition, while the imperial tradition has generally viewed the 
natural world as largely indifferent to human interests. For arcadian thinkers from Coleridge to 
Emerson, human nature mirrored a natural world that encompassed and animated the very 
human experience that reflected it. According to Worster, romantic literature always expressed 
“a longing to reestablish an inner harmony between man and nature through an outer physical 
reconciliation,” and contemporary environmental philosophy has been influenced by the 
arcadian “search for a lost pastoral haven” in which mankind’s inherent place within nature can 
be recovered.8 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 18. 
7 Ibid., 30. 
8 Ibid., 8-16.  
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In contra-distinction, Linnaean (imperial) thinkers “were eager to enlist Lord Bacon’s 
imperialist cause” in the human conquest of an alien natural world. 
 
That world was not to be studied through love or sympathy — indeed, 
could not be, for it was widely subscribed to by scientists that nature had 
to be cleansed of sentiment and so deliberately made unappealing to 
human feelings. Such had been the Baconian mission from the first. The 
quest for objectivity also meant that the outer physical world was to be 
kept firmly separated from all religious experience. Science was laying 
claim to nature, warning the pious to go elsewhere for their inspiration.9 
 
This humanistic imperialism also had its intellectual roots in Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics: 
“From the work of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton in particular there emerged the figure of a 
vast celestial contrivance set in operation by an omniscient mathematician” and proclaiming 
simultaneously “the kingdom of mind over matter and man over nature.” Alien and inanimate, 
the natural world became valuable to humanity solely as a resource for human exploitation. 
Cartesian dualism had remote ideological origins in the Judeo-Christian separation of heaven and 
earth, spirit and flesh, God and humanity. However, in the cultural milieu of the Enlightenment 
especially, “reason was to be the weapon by which this empire would be won” via rationalism, 
empiricism, and the scientific method.10 From these origins, through Darwinism, utilitarianism, 
positivism, and contemporary evolutionary naturalism, Descartes’ vision of humankind’s 
“mastery and possession of nature” has configured the world-view of western culture.  
Conversely, the arcadian paradigm has been predicated upon an assumption of radical 
interdependence between humanity and nature. This holistic ontological orientation in contrast 
to Cartesian dualism has “ebbed and flowed with extraordinary persistence throughout the 
modern period”11 in spite of dominant imperial cultural trends. While imperial science 
acknowledges a certain affiliation between human life and the natural world (that the human 
organism depends upon the resources around it to thrive, for instance) its paradigm remains 
strongly influenced by the Baconian-Cartesian subject/object dichotomy that manifests itself in 
the perceived division between the vital intellect and the abstract natural world. The arcadian 
perspective, however, assumes no such separation, does not view the natural world as inanimate 
or an abstraction, and does not see nature as a resource to be observed and exploited via a 
critically detached and disembodied mind. From Emerson’s transcendentalism to (the later) Aldo 
Leopold’s “land ethic,” arcadian thinking has been inspired by the belief that human nature is 
inextricably involved with the natural world from which it springs, and cannot be adequately 
conceived apart from this animating ground.  
Arcadian holism has also, therefore, involved a conception of nature that is “vitalistic,” in that 
it envisions the natural world as alive and intelligent (a view which stands in obvious contrast to 
the imperial vision of nature as essentially unconscious matter). Moreover, it is vitalistic in the 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 89. 
10 Ibid., 39; 87-92.  
11 Ibid., 21. 
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sense that it views nature’s intelligence as meaningful and purposeful rather than blindly 
mechanistic. Nature actively seeks the fulfillment of ultimate goals rather than being driven 
exclusively by mindless “efficient causes.” From Hegelian idealism to Alfred North Whitehead’s 
organicism and Arne Naess’ deep ecology, arcadian thinking has retained a sense of purpose (or 
purposes) in nature’s design. In contrast to the meaningless imperial universe driven by 
mechanistic causation, the arcadian universe is a living expression of divine or transcendent 
intelligence. While imperial science has eradicated all purposes from the natural world except for 
purposes imposed on it by the Baconian-Cartesian intellect, arcadian thinking has tended to 
integrate human interests intimately with the larger interests of the natural world to which they 
belong.  
  In comparing what he terms the “pastoral” legacy (which shares many similarities with the 
arcadian) with the “progressive” legacy (which shares much with the imperial) in American 
political environmental thought, Bob Pepperman Taylor notes that the “pastoral” has 
traditionally assumed an ”outsiders” critique of popular culture while the “progressive” has 
almost always taken on an insider’s role, accommodating its worldview to the prevailing ethos 
of commercial and established public interests.12 Similarly, in Worster’s paradigm it is the 
imperial tradition (like the progressive) which has come to play a dominant role in intellectual 
and cultural life, while the arcadian tradition (like the pastoral) has been largely marginalized. 
Worster suggests that the concept of human nature in relation to the environment can be 
understood historically in terms of a dialectical interplay between these opposing perspectives, 
with the imperial finally superseding (though being simultaneously influenced by) the arcadian. 
Examining the succession of ideas regarding humanity’s relationship with the natural world in 
the metaphysics of Emerson, Royce, and Dewey, with reference to this imperial-arcadian 
dynamic, appears to affirm Worster’s thesis in many important respects. 
 
Emerson as an Arcadian Thinker 
 
As both an original thinker and as an intellectual product of his historical milieu, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson remains an exemplar of the arcadian conception of nature. From the publication of 
Nature in 1836 virtually until his death in 1882, Emerson’s transcendentalism reflected the course 
of American intellectual culture, and the sources of his worldview — developed gradually during 
the course of a prolific and complex career — are multifarious. In the perennially relevant Main 
Currents in American Thought, Parrington famously notes that Emerson’s thought was influenced 
by the liberal strain of Arminian Unitarianism in nineteenth-century New England, but was 
inspired primarily by the romantic vision of “Continental Idealism, with its transcendental 
metaphysics,” particularly as articulated by Goethe and re-interpreted by Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle.13 In his Religious History of the American People, Sydney Ahlstrom 
comments that a synthesis of continental idealism and romanticism “seals his bond with the 
Romantic’s tendency to combine post-Kantian idealism with an enthusiasm for Spinoza and the 
                                                 
12 Taylor, Our Limits Transgressed, 133 -51.  
13 Louis Vernon Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation from the Beginnings to 1920 (New 
York: Harcourt Brace, 1930), 386-95. 
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mystical spiritualism of Swedenborg.”14 Daniel Walker Howe has examined how both the 
theology of Cambridge Platonism and the “faculty psychology” of the Scottish Enlightenment 
shaped Emerson’s conception of self-identity. Others, like William Goetzmann, emphasize the 
influence of popular charismatic religious movements stretching as far back as the First Great 
Awakening on transcendentalism’s appreciation for nature-inspired spiritual enthusiasm.15 In the 
social context of a pious, increasingly egalitarian, still largely pre-industrial America in the midst 
of the Second Great Awakening, this combination of intellectual forces shaped a concept of the 
natural world that became arcadian in Worster’s sense.  
Emerson, for instance, has an arcadian faith in nature’s inherent beneficent design and in 
human nature’s harmonious interdependence with the natural order. In opposition to the 
imperial depiction of a meaningless natural world valuable only as an object of exploitation, he 
writes: 
 
All things are moral, and their boundless changes have an unceasing 
reference to spiritual nature. Therefore is nature glorious with form, color, 
and motion, that every globe in the remotest heaven, every chemical 
change from the crystal up to the laws of life, every change in vegetation 
from the first principle of growth in the eye of the leaf, to the tropical 
rainforest and coalmine, every animal function from the sponge up to 
Hercules, shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong.16  
 
Emerson views this vital spirit and transcendent intelligence animating the natural order in direct 
contrast to aimless Cartesian mechanistic cause. The cosmic order is purposeful or teleological, 
rather than merely mechanistically causal. Both its eternal laws and evolving dynamics reflect an 
ultimate meaning and spirit. Nature, and humanity as involved in nature, is the actualization of 
a transcendent destiny.  
Emerson’s vision of nature is also arcadian by virtue of its holistic character. As Ahlstrom 
states, he “commits himself wholly to the organic metaphor: the identity of mind and nature was 
his first postulate.”17 The natural order both mirrors and informs the human experience through 
which its intelligence is realized.  
 
We learn that the highest is present to the soul of man; that the universal 
essence, which is not wisdom or love or beauty, but all in one, is that for 
which all things exist ... does not act upon us from without . . .but 
spiritually or through ourselves . . . therefore that spirit, that is the Supreme 
Being, does not build up nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as 
                                                 
14 Sydney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 604.  
15 David Walker Howe, Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 189-211; William Goetzmann, Beyond the Revolution: A History of American Thought from Paine to Pragmatism 
(New York: Perseus Books, 2009), 185-96. 
16 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Nature,” Selected Essays, Lectures, and Poems. ed. Robert Richardson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 34-35. 
17 Ahlstrom, A Religious History, 604.  
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the life of the tree puts forth new branches and leaves through the pores of 
the old. 18  
 
In contrast to Baconian-Cartesian dualism sundering human intelligence from the natural world, 
Emerson dissolves much of the distinction between mind/matter, ideal/real, and man/nature that 
makes this dualism possible. Nature, for Emerson, is the manifestation of an omniscient and 
ubiquitous “over-soul” which remains co-extensive with human nature. Worster observes that 
“Emerson as much as other romantics perceived nature’s marvelous unity, in which nothing can 
exist apart from the whole,”19 and Philip Cafaro similarly reads Emerson as a “virtue ethicist” 
whose transcendentalist values are shaped largely by the romantic legacy and inspire Thoreau’s 
belief in humanity’s interdependence with nature.20  
Of course, Emerson’s thought has some dualistic overtones that occasionally sound more 
imperial than arcadian. He sometimes refers to humanity and nature in terms that echo Bacon 
more than Gilbert White. “Nature is thoroughly mediate,” he says. “It is made to serve. It receives 
the dominion of man as meekly as the ass on which the Savior rode. It offers its kingdom as raw 
material which he may mold into what is useful.”21 Notwithstanding the predominant influence 
of romanticism and idealism, Emerson’s world-view, no less than Bacon’s, was also rooted in 
science and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Worster notes that “Emerson’s sharp hunger for 
power,” just as Bacon’s, is grounded in the Christian tradition’s imperial view of nature as “a 
subordinate world requiring man’s reformatory zeal,”22 and this may echo what Charles 
Taliaferro describes as an ideal of “divine ownership” or “sovereign stewardship” over nature, 
popular in the colonial theology of New England to which Emerson was heir.23 Peter Hay and 
others have claimed that, although transcendentalist thought often approached the kind of 
biocentric orientation found in contemporary ecological thought, its “desire to immerse in 
wilderness was less that of an ecological sensibility than its opposite: A mechanism of individual 
salvation,” the romantic impulse being more anthropocentric than biocentric in character.24 In The 
Idea of Wilderness, Max Oelschlaeger goes even farther by claiming that, just like his 
transcendentalist contemporaries with the exception of Thoreau, Emerson’s view of nature 
remains “enframed by a Baconian-Cartesian perspective: Nature is mere putty in human hands, 
bestowed by God on His most favored creation, man.”25  
Emerson’s glorification of “progress,” as Worster mentions, often does sound similar in tone 
to “the Baconian notion of progress (. . . he [Emerson] frequently spoke with expansive pride of 
                                                 
18 Emerson, “Nature,” 49.  
19 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 104.  
20 Philip Cafaro, Thoreau’s Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Virtue (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
2006). 
21 Emerson, “Nature,” 35. 
22 Worster, Nature's Economy, 106-7.  
23 Charles Taliaferro, ”Land, Labor, and God in American Colonial Thought,” The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism. ed. 
Thomas Hilde, Paul Thompson (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 77-100. 
24 Peter Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Nash, 
Wilderness and the American Mind, 1982; Philip Gura, American Transcendentalism: A History (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2007).  
25 Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness, 135. 
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the westward march of civilization by means of the steamboat and railroad),” and Carolyn 
Merchant also emphasizes Emerson’s propensity to “ fuse enthusiasm for nature with enthusiasm 
for the market.”26 In The Machine in the Garden, Leo Marx also describes an inclination toward “the 
rhetoric of the technological sublime” in much of Emerson’s work. Emerson, he points out, often 
talks as though he envisions the railroad to be just as worthy of veneration as the hills and the 
stars.27 More recently, studies like Robert White’s The Organic Machine consider how these 
dimensions of Emerson’s thought may have also helped to inspire a legacy of imperial values and 
policies that regarded nature as an energy resource for human cultivation: Emerson’s tendency 
to “rejoice in the ability of the machine to subjugate and control nature” being at least as 
influential as his celebration of “the spiritual truth that nature provided.”28 And as Corrington 
and many others have observed, Emerson’s later thought (beginning with “Experience” in 1844) 
began to portray nature itself as more sublime than pastoral, and humanity as more separate from 
than in harmony with the natural world, “as if nature begins to mock the imperial self that was 
once so sure of its place in the world.”29  
Unlike Bacon or Descartes, however, Emerson more often speaks of humanity’s moral 
redemption arising from and realized within nature, rather than through its domination.  
 
One mind is everywhere active, in each ray of star, in each wavelet of the 
pool . . . All things proceed out of the same spirit, and all things conspire 
with it. Whilst a man seeks good ends, he is strong by the whole strength 
of nature . . . It makes the sky and the hills sublime, and the silent song of 
the stars is in it. By it, the universe is made habitable, not by science or 
power.30  
 
Emerson’s vision is thus arcadian in the sense that it rejects the Baconian-type conquest of nature 
which the imperial tradition embraces. Marx acknowledges that, overall, Emerson’s goal is 
always to reconcile the material potentialities of inevitable technological progress with the more 
important spiritually redeeming powers of the natural world in a way that leaves nature, if not 
unchanged, at least undefiled. And as a cultural icon Emerson remains the premier exemplar of 
“romantic American pastoralism.”31 Worster agrees that Emerson is “not an uncritical advocate 
of all technological progress”: he rejects any ontology that divests nature of inherent value or that 
separates human interest from its natural context. His worldview is pastoral in Taylor’s sense, 
and he certainly does not advocate any ruthlessly imperialistic science, technology, or public 
policy that divides nature from human nature, with the former regarded merely as an object of 
exploitation by the latter. And whatever imperial ideas or projects his celebration of “the technical 
                                                 
26 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 75. 
27 Marx, The Machine in the Garden, 230. 
28 Robert White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill/Wang, 1995), 35. 
29 Robert Corrington, “Emerson and the Agricultural Midworld,” The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism (Nashville, TN: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 140-152. 
30 Emerson, ”Divinity School Address,” Selected Essays, lectures and Poems. ed. Robert Richardson (New York: 
Bantam, 1990), 264. 
31 Marx, The Machine in the Garden, 230.  
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sublime” may have, however indirectly, engendered, the most significant influence of the 
“Emersonian Legacy” (to use Bradley Dean’s term) was clearly on the deeply arcadian 
environmental philosophies of Thoreau and Muir.32 Ultimately, Emerson believes that “[i]n the 
woods, we return to reason and faith.”33 He embraces science and technology as one limited 
means by which nature realizes its own purpose via the human purposes through which nature’s 
“spirit” becomes manifest. 
 
The Idealism of Royce as a Transition from the Arcadian Vision of Nature toward a More 
Imperial Vision 
 
Emerson’s Arcadian worldview was fostered largely by the cultural context of the nineteenth 
century — a context that began to change, of course, with the onset of new social and intellectual 
developments as the twentieth century approached. Between the publication of Emerson’s Nature 
in 1836 and Dewey’s Experience and Nature in 1925,34 America underwent social and demographic 
transformations that led from rural towns to teeming cities, from family farms to industrial 
assembly lines, and from (relatively) tranquil village life to the confusion and competition of 
urban sprawl. William Cronon has noted how the transcendentalist’s “primitive sublime” nature-
aesthetic in the early to mid-nineteenth century was rapidly changing by the outset of the 
twentieth century to a more “domesticated” management-friendly ideal, reflected in the art, 
natural histories, and conservation movement of the Progressive era.35 Moreover, the intellectual 
paradigm exemplified by Newton’s cosmology, Locke’s rational psychology, and Paley’s “chain 
of being” was being reconfigured radically by Darwin’s “struggle for existence,” the irrational 
drives of the Freudian unconscious, and Einstein’s new physics. During an era that Dewey’s 
contemporary, Henry Steele Commager, in The American Mind describes as “the watershed of the 
1890’s,” social transformations such as urbanization, industrialization, immigration, and 
technology created a pronounced divide between an older American ethos conducive to the 
arcadian worldview, and a newer spirit more conducive in many ways to the imperial 
perspective.36  
 
On one side lies an America predominantly agricultural; concerned with 
domestic problems; conforming, intellectually at least, to the political, 
social, and moral principles inherited from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
Centuries . . . on the other hand lies the modern America, predominantly 
urban and industrial . . . experiencing profound changes in population, 
social institutions, economy, and technology; and trying to accommodate 
                                                 
32 Bradley Dean, ”Natural History, Romanticism, and Thoreau,” American Wilderness (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 77-81. 
33 Emerson, “Nature,” 18. 
34 John Dewey, The Later Works of John Dewey Vol. 1, 1925-1853: 1925, Experience and Nature. ed. Jo Ann Boydston 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008). 
35 William Cronon, “Wilderness Lost,” American Environmental History, ed. L. Warren (Boston: Blackwell Publishing, 
2003), 213-36. 
36 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950). 
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its traditional institutions and habits of thought to conditions new and in 
part alien.37 
 
The philosophy of Josiah Royce in many respects exemplifies this transition in “the American 
Mind.” His views on nature and human consciousness in particular are illustrative of the 
transition from the more arcadian vision of pre-twentieth century America to the relatively more 
imperial vision of the twentieth century. As a philosopher anticipating this transition, Royce 
attempted to reconcile imperial elements of the pragmatism of his contemporaries with the more 
arcadian idealism of his predecessors. Representative of a brief time during which “Emerson’s 
Transcendentalism had lost its hold and James’ Pragmatism was still to come,” Royce was 
nonetheless a contemporary of both James and Dewey. Unlike Emerson, Royce’s desire for an 
arcadian conception of humankind’s place in the natural world was influenced by adverse 
intellectual and cultural circumstances, when historically “the neat orderly universe of the 
enlightenment was disintegrating under the blows of Darwinian evolution, the new physics, and 
the new biology.”38  
Though Darwinism undermined somewhat the strict, stable, mechanism of Cartesian 
metaphysics upon which the imperial conceptualization of nature was predicated, it was even 
more subversive of the arcadian vision of pastoral harmony and ultimate purposes in nature’s 
cosmology. Darwin, Worster notes, did much to eradicate Cartesian mind-body dualism that 
separated the human soul from its natural context: dislodging the human species from its 
privileged hierarchical status in the Enlightenment’s cosmic “chain of being” (celebrated equally 
by poets like Alexander Pope and theologians like William Paley) and relocating it in the 
tumultuous rout of wild nature. However, the Darwinian concept of human experience within 
nature, though biocentric, is hardly holistic in any harmonious arcadian sense. Darwin-inspired 
metaphysics tend to involve the human organism in perpetual struggle with the very 
environments that sustain it, and this gives rise to a new kind of Darwinian-imperial kind of 
dualism that is, in many respects, even more adversarial than the Enlightenment-imperial 
dualism of Descartes and Bacon (ecology after Darwin, says Worster, supplanted economics as 
the truly “dismal science”).  
Royce attempts to salvage an arcadian conception of nature via idealism in the face of this 
hostile new imperial realism. Jackson Lears has interpreted American cultural changes from 1880 
to 1920 as part of a larger perpetual quest for “regeneration” that had its roots in early American 
Protestant notions of spiritual rebirth, and re-emerged in the political, socio-economic, and moral-
religious reform movements of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.39 In Ministers of Reform, 
Robert Crunden interprets the moralizing reform-minded tone of this generation’s thinkers and 
activists as a kind of secularized missionary zeal.40 Royce’s thought may be productively read in 
this way, as an attempt to somehow fuse an earlier Calvinist eschatology of divine determinism 
with a pragmatic urge for social justice. His formative religious influences were evangelical 
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through his father’s affiliation with the Disciples of Christ, but even more strongly liberal-
protestant via his mother’s membership in the Congregationalist Church (the same denomination 
as Dewey). Having studied in Germany from 1875-76, Royce was deeply affected during his 
nascent stage of philosophical development by the idealist tradition, from Fichte to 
Schopenhauer. However, his thought after 1882 was also influenced largely by pragmatist 
colleagues at Harvard like Charles Sanders Peirce and William James , and his mature work 
reflects the desire to reconcile this pragmatist influence with his religious and idealist 
predilections. To accomplish this, he employs a Hegelian-type dialectic to synthesize both 
perspectives within an ultimately harmonious world-view. His thinking thus shares elements of 
Emerson’s arcadian transcendentalism and more imperial Darwinian strains of Dewey’s 
pragmatism, although its perspective remains largely arcadian in spirit. 
Royce shares Emerson’s pastoral pre-industrial-era concept of a vital and beneficent nature, 
which fosters a relatively non-dualistic relationship between human nature and the natural 
world. His conception of nature is vitalistic in a Hegelian sense: nature is the dynamic through 
which the Absolute Universal Spirit, in its relative particular incarnations, seeks consummation 
with itself through historical synthesis. “God cannot be one,” he writes, “except by being many. 
Nor can we various selves be many, unless we in Him are one.” The Absolute, experienced as 
“my fellow and myself with nature between us,” moves toward ultimate fulfillment through its 
own self-realization. “The whole of reality is the expression of a single conscious purpose or the 
realm of one internally harmonized experience.”41 
In this way Royce also shares Emerson’s arcadian concept of nature as holistic. Nature is the 
active expression — in a pluralistic and material world — of a single universal spirit. “We propose 
to answer the question: What is it to be?” he writes “by the assertion that to be means simply to 
express, to embody the internal meaning of a certain absolute set of ideas — a system, moreover, 
which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea, however 
fragmentary.”42 In this manner, nature as the realization of “Absolute Spirit” achieves a 
continuous unity of internal meaning and external experience, subjective idea and objective fact, 
and transcendent spirit and immanent materiality. 
For Royce, as for Emerson, the natural world is fulfilled in the human consciousness through 
which its “purpose” is realized. The ultimate fulfillment of human potentiality is realized most 
completely when it is experienced in harmony with the benign will and spirit of nature, where 
“nature” is understood as an aspect of the divine order. This leads Royce, like Emerson, to posit 
an idealism that ultimately reconciles material nature and spiritual nature rather than to posit a 
Gnostic mysticism that simply exalts the human spirit at the expense of a debased corporeal 
world. In his history of panpsychism in the west, David Skrbina describes Royce’s early idealism, 
through The World and the Individual (published in 1899 and 1901), as thoroughly panpsychic, 
identifying the “Absolute Self” with “conscious nature” and depicting the natural world as 
infused with the same animating spirit as humanity.43  
                                                 
41 Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 210-86.  
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Yet, despite its important continuities with the arcadian tradition of Emerson, Royce’s 
thought also shares important similarities with his more Darwinian imperial-oriented pragmatist 
contemporaries. Often, for instance, in work like Self-consciousness, Consciousness, and Nature, 
Royce seems to depict humanity’s relationship with nature in holistic Emersonian-sounding 
terms: “The nature experience, so our hypothesis supposes, is in a considerable degree, relatively 
continuous with ours. There is experience in nature which closely resembles human experience . 
. . all this experience hints to its presence.”44 Deeper examination of this experience, however, 
yields an even more fundamental Darwinian kind of dualism between conscious agent and 
physical environment that anticipates Dewey’s instrumentalism: 
 
Consciousness as we know it in man and interpret its presence in animals, 
is an incident of interrupted adjustment . . . that involves alteration of old 
habits to meet new conditions [and hence] nature, as such, would neither 
be a world of fixed habits or yet a world of mere novelties, but rather a 
world of experience with permanence everywhere offset by change.45 
 
 Royce’s opposition between organism and environment in nature tempers an Emersonian-
arcadian appreciation for holism and stasis, with a more Darwinian-imperial concept of nature 
characterized also by conflict and change. 
An address by Royce to the National Geographic Society in 1896, later published as The Pacific 
Coast: A Psychological Study of the Relation Between Climate and Civilization, perhaps best illustrates 
the simultaneous influence of, and departure from, the arcadian ethos.46 In it, he describes daily 
life in the natural environment on California’s coast with insight and sensitivity reminiscent of 
Walden. Here and elsewhere, his appreciation for pastoral and agrarian communities living close 
to and connected with their natural environments, his sympathy with the kinds of worldviews 
and values that such communities engender, and his “mistrust of industrial modernity,” is in 
many respects, as Hilde suggests, “closer to that of Emerson and Thoreau than it was to Dewey’s 
techno-optimism.”47 However, even though its discussion of the effects of topography, climate, 
foliage, and fauna on human community and psychology is subtle, Royce — unlike Emerson and 
Thoreau — views these relations in more abstract terms: as interrelated rather than 
interdependent. Two unreconciled aspects, perhaps, of a dialectical movement toward union in 
an as yet unrealized “Absolute Spirit” that embodies nature’s ultimate purpose.  
For the transcendentalists, nature is a vital experience intrinsic to human consciousness itself. 
Human promise and potential is fulfilled in communion with the natural world: “The Beauty of 
nature,” writes Emerson, “reforms itself in the mind, not for barren contemplation, but for new 
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creation.”48 For Royce, in contrast, nature is incomplete in itself and, “man’s relations with nature 
. . . are in general, a neutral material on which ethical relations may be based.”49 The natural world 
and its experience becomes much more abstract, intellectualized, and dispassionate in Royce’s 
thought than in Emerson’s.  
As John Stuhr has observed: “The puzzling aspect” of Royce’s thinking “was its peculiar 
contrast” in many ways “to the pluralism and open-endedness of the growing, dominant 
American pragmatism” of James and Dewey; yet at the same time, “Royce’s thought is not out of 
touch with the American pragmatic tradition, but fully in consonance with it in a number of 
places.”50 And while the traditional consensus often places Royce within the idealist tradition, it 
is not uncommon for many recent commentators to stress his Pragmatist affiliations. Jacquelyn 
Kegley, for instance, claims that “from the outset, Royce is a pragmatist” and discusses his views 
on issues like self and community as continuous with those of Peirce, James, and Mead. Ben 
Minteer highlights how his later “work is quite compatible with his pragmatic brethren” and even 
exerted an important influence on the “civic pragmatism” of Progressive Era environmental 
activists.51 Royce himself calls much of his later philosophy “absolute pragmatism” and shares 
many concerns and perspectives with James, Peirce, and Dewey. “Truth,” he states, “means, as 
pragmatism asserts, the fulfillment of a need.”52 And like Dewey, he embraces the instrumental 
value of science as mediator between human purposes and the natural world from which they 
both derive and in which they become manifest.53  
This position suggests a more accommodating attitude toward modern science and 
technology than that of his more arcadian transcendentalist predecessors, including Emerson. 
Although Royce shares many of Emerson’s metaphysical assumptions regarding human nature 
in relation to the natural world, his thinking nonetheless takes a significant step in the direction 
of imperial, Darwinian, and of pragmatist, attitudes toward humankind and nature which is 
perhaps an inevitable consequence of its material, social, and intellectual context. 
 
Dewey’s Pragmatism as a Transition from the Arcadian to the Imperial 
 
In his history of American ideas, William Goetzmann writes that four particular schools of 
thought exemplify larger cultural trends occurring at the beginning of the twentieth century: 
Darwinism in the sciences and social sciences, legal positivism, aesthetic realism, and, most 
prominently, pragmatism.54 Although contemporaneous with that of Royce, Dewey’s philosophy 
can be (and often is) read as anticipating an entirely different historical era. While Emerson and 
Royce can be seen as direct successors to the romanticism and idealism of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Dewey (notwithstanding his self-characterization as a “modern” thinker 
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and heir to the legacy of Bacon) is sometimes read as a progenitor of the post-modern ethos.55 
Insofar as post-modernity represents the culmination of many modernist assumptions rather than 
simply a rejection of the enlightenment, Dewey’s interpretation of modern science and 
instrumentalism exemplifies this trend in many ways. Publishing his first scholarly paper in 1882, 
he remained prolific and increasingly popular until the mid-twentieth century. His intellectual 
influence has been persistent and, from Gifford Pinchot to Aldo Leopold to current 
“environmental pragmatism,” environmental thinkers have shared elements of Dewey’s 
instrumentalist and naturalistic outlook.  
While Emerson and (somewhat more ambiguously) Royce can be seen as arcadian thinkers 
with respect to their conceptions of humankind and nature, Dewey is arguably far more imperial 
in perspective. Like Royce, Dewey attempts to synthesize arcadian and imperial perspectives on 
the natural world. However, Dewey proceeds in a manner that often tends to emphasize imperial 
themes and assumptions much more than Royce, and certainly more than Emerson. While Royce 
can be seen as taking some hesitant steps in the general direction toward which American thought 
and civilization were headed at this time, Dewey forged ahead ambitiously in this direction and 
consequently hastened the transition from an arcadian to an imperial perspective on the natural 
world, as Worster describes it.  
Dewey’s metaphysical orientation does share much with that of Emerson, Royce, and the 
arcadian tradition. In The Agrarian Roots of Pragmatism, Corrington and Hickman highlight values 
and themes that fostered a common “agrarian” legacy from transcendentalism through 
pragmatism. The turn in Emerson’s later thought emphasized a tension between, on one hand, 
human nature that craves order and harmony, and on the other, the unceasing flux of chaotic 
cosmic forces in wild nature. From this vantage-point “nature was no longer the nurturing 
mother, but the indifferent fate and power that surrounded and mocked the self.” Emerson saw 
the self’s symbolic salvation in the agrarian ideal of the farmer who cultivated a “midworld” 
between wild nature and the domesticated world,56 and this ideal is echoed in Dewey’s 
instrumentalist concept of “intelligence” mediating the relationship between organism and 
environment. Dewey’s “edible schoolyard,” involving students cultivating classroom gardens at 
the University of Chicago Primary School, is a perfect example of this concept in action,57 and was 
an endeavor that Emerson would no doubt have supported. 
Like Royce, Dewey was influenced early-on by the Hegelian tradition, and idealist influences 
were never entirely absent from his thinking. Stuhr points out that like the transcendentalists and 
idealists, who also never subscribed to the strict Cartesian dichotomy between nature and human 
consciousness, Dewey similarly rejects any such division between conscious experience and the 
wider reality of which it is a part. Moreover, “in turning to Royce’s view of the self, again like the 
Pragmatists, we find Royce affirming a strongly anti-Cartesian view. The self is not a thing.”58 
Commenting on “John Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism,” Larry Hickman describes Dewey’s 
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thought as holistic in a very arcadian sense. “As a committed evolutionary naturalist,” he writes, 
“Dewey accepted and argued for the view that human beings are in and a part of nature, not over 
against it.”59  
Certainly, Dewey’s conception of the natural world was complex, and evolved considerably 
during the course of his “early,” “middle,” and “later” career (characterized by Raymond 
Boisvert as his “Hegelian,” “instrumentalist,” and “naturalistic” phases, respectively). 
Nonetheless, Dewey (born in the year that Darwin’s Origin of Species was published — 1859) was 
indeed more an “evolutionary naturalist” than anything like a “transcendentalist” or “idealist” 
as were Emerson or Royce, and this continuity runs through the entire course of his work. In 
much more imperial terms, Dewey depicts humankind’s involvement with nature as 
characterized by Darwinian struggle rather than arcadian harmony. The human condition is 
essentially configured by “The fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a 
world of things.”60 In Dewey’s Metaphysics, Boisvert also notes that the influence of Darwinian 
struggle on Dewey’s thought ensured that “Dewey was a naturalist who stressed the interaction 
of existents with their environments as the primordial trait of existence.”61 And even Hugh 
McDonald, who defends an arcadian-type interpretation of Dewey’s environmental thought, 
acknowledges that, “Dewey was above all a student of Darwin . . . With humans described as 
organisms interacting with other organisms in an environment they are in and of.”62 Dewey 
writes:  
 
Where ever there is life, there is behavior, activity. In order that life may 
persist, this activity has to be both continuous and adapted to the 
environment . . . It does something to the environment . . . In the interests 
of the maintenance of life there is transformation of some elements in the 
surrounding medium. The higher the form of life, the more important is 
the active reconstruction of the medium.63 
  
Along with this metaphysics of Darwinian struggle comes an admiration for modern science and 
instrumental reason as “mediums” through which humanity transforms its natural environment 
via active “intelligence.” In this way, Dewey is an advocate of the imperial-Linnaean tradition’s 
imperial or “Baconian” science. Unlike Emerson or Royce who seek to “keep science in its place,” 
Dewey wishes to “transfer the experimental method from the technical field of science to the 
wider field of human life generally.”64 Dewey, in fact, lauds Bacon’s imperial science as the great 
liberating intellectual event of modernity: “Bacon’s watchword that knowledge is power and his 
dream of continuous empire over natural forces by means of natural science have been actualized. 
The industrial revolution by steam and electricity is the reply to Bacon’s prophecy . . . 
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Philosophical reconstruction for the present is thus the endeavor to . . . permit Baconian 
aspirations to come to a free and unhindered expression.”65  
Of course Dewey is not simply a naive advocate of Baconian science, utilitarianism, or of the 
imperial world-view. In The Metaphysical Club, Louis Menand actually describes the pragmatism 
of both Dewey and James as a kind of refutation of imperial science in a manner that is 
reminiscent of their arcadian predecessors.66 
  
Pragmatism seems a reflection of the late nineteenth century faith in 
scientific inquiry — yet James introduced it in order to attack the 
pretensions of late nineteenth century science. Pragmatism seems 
Darwinian — yet it was openly hostile to the two most prominent 
Darwinists of the time: Spencer and Huxley . . . and it had nothing to do 
with people like William Graham Sumner and the eugenics movement, 
which was based on the work of Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton. 
Pragmatism seems to derive from statistical thinking — but many 
nineteenth century naturalists were committed to principles that were 
alien to everything James and Dewey wrote. Pragmatism shares Emerson’s 
distrust of institutions and systems, and his manner of appropriating ideas 
while discarding their foundations.67  
 
Similarly, in his examination of the connection between “civic pragmatism” and environmental 
thought during the Progressive Era, Ben Minteer explores how Dewey shared the belief with 
contemporaneous conservationists that “human interests and goods were thoroughly enmeshed 
in the parts and processes of the natural world, and fullness of experience could not be achieved 
by following the purely utilitarian strategy so dominant in urban life.”68 Dewey’s metaphysics, 
therefore, stresses holism rather than a simple Platonic or Cartesian dualism, and much like 
Emerson and Royce depicts humanity as radically involved in nature. In Experience and Nature 
and elsewhere he contends that nature configures, and is in turn configured by, human 
experience. “Environment,” he explains, “is not something around and about human activities in 
an external sense; it is their medium and their milieu, in the sense that a medium is inter-mediate 
in the carrying out of human activities, as well as the channel through which and by which they 
go on.”69 Nature, therefore, is involved in shaping human reality and values for Dewey much as 
it is for Emerson and Royce.  
Certainly much of Dewey’s later work emphasizes arcadian-sounding themes as well, 
suggesting that he also shares many aesthetic and spiritual views with Emerson and the 
Romantics. Philip Jackson notes that, much like Emerson and Carlyle, who tended to reject 
abstract art-objects in favor of active aesthetic appreciation of ordinary experiences in the natural 
world, Dewey “speaks of art as being a quality of doing and what is done, rather than a noun 
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substantive,” which in turn fosters a reverence for natural “objects and events not solely in terms 
of how they might serve us, but also as centers of attention in their own right.”70 Dewey writes 
that “[a]rt is the solvent union of the generic, established, ordered phase of nature, with its phase 
that is incomplete, on-going, and hence still uncertain, contingent and novel,” and suggests that 
nature as experience is perhaps best appreciated in its harmonious (arcadian) unity.71 McDonald 
also lauds the “organic holism” that characterizes Dewey’s attitude toward nature, and claims 
that his values are arcadian in spirit: involving holism, genuine kinds of intrinsic value in nature, 
and reverence for the natural world.72 Indeed, the kind of “natural piety” that Dewey endorses in 
A Common Faith certainly sounds reminiscent of Emerson’s experience of the divine (or that of 
Coleridge, who Dewey so much admired), even if devoid of Emerson’s (or Coleridge’s) 
metaphysical overtones.73 
However, Dewey (perhaps more often) also sounds like an unreserved apologist for the 
imperial conception of the natural world and “Baconian aspirations” which, when “freely 
expressed,” amount to nothing less than the complete construction of nature according to 
humankind’s instrumentalist requirements. Hickman declares that “Dewey’s instrumentalism” 
depicts “nature as a complex of objects of knowledge” which “is neither complete in itself apart 
from human interaction, nor the locus of extra-human deliberation . . . Nature is instead a multi-
faceted construct that has been slowly and laboriously built up over thousands of years of human 
history by means of various tools of inquiry.”74  
Dewey’s thinking likewise lends itself to imperial uses in its rejection of spirit, vitalism, or 
any sense of ultimate transcendent purpose in nature. “His anti-transcendentalism,” states 
Hickman, “would have led Dewey to reject attempts by some environmental ethicists to sacralize 
nature as a thing-in-itself with values, interests, or rights that are purely intrinsic to it.”75 Though 
Dewey rejects any mechanical and dualistic Cartesian ontology, he likewise rejects any idealistic 
vitality or absolute ground of meaning in nature. Skrbina contrasts Dewey’s “half-hearted” brand 
of vitalism in the natural world — devoid of transcendent or purposeful substance — with 
Royce’s full-blown panpsychism,76 and indeed, rather than being any kind of transcendent 
archetype or originating ground, nature for Dewey is no more or less than open and radically 
contingent possibility. It is the sheer potentiality for “experience” and “growth,” and is the 
“medium” for a “radical empiricism” in which these potentials are actualized. As James Campbell 
emphasizes, Dewey’s nature is delimited to possible experience because, in an important sense, 
nature is experience, and experience is the medium in and through which organism and 
environment meet, engage, and transform both themselves and the reality of experience and 
nature itself. “Experience is to be understood in the sense of a process of interactions between an 
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organism and its environment, a process that finds the organism undergoing change and striving 
for control.”77  
Dewey writes that metaphysical idealists of Emerson’s or Royce’s stripe wish, vainly, to see 
some ultimate, eternal, and universal “structure” at the foundation of nature, and “they agree in 
supposing that structure has some superlative reality” that transcends nature’s dynamic flux. 
However “the isolation of structure from the changes whose stable ordering it is, renders it 
mysterious,” and this remnant of Platonic dualism is not only mysterious, but also incoherent 
and ineffectual as a depiction of nature.78 
Rather than some transcendentalist or idealist expression of absolute immutable Truth, nature 
for Dewey is instead the medium in and through which an instrumental human intelligence 
transforms the very environment that shapes human intelligence itself. Thus the human 
domination of nature is, in this sense, one of nature’s own supreme achievements. “It was not 
until ends were banished from nature that purposes became important as factors in human minds 
capable of reshaping existence. A natural world that does not subsist for the sake of realizing a 
fixed set of ends is relatively malleable and plastic; it may be used for this or that.”79 In this way, 
Dewey might also be appropriately described as a progressive as opposed to pastoral thinker in 
Taylor’s lexicon, generally rejecting an idealized (arcadian) kind of “return to nature” and 
allowing for (imperial) “scientific control of the environment,” and even a “technocratic approach 
to environmental problems.”80 Dewey’s metaphysics is therefore (notwithstanding his arcadian 
sympathies) amenable to interpretation as being in accord with what Jackson Lears has labeled 
“The Official Modern Culture in Industrial America” and what Samuel Hays has called the 
“Gospel of Efficiency” — emphasizing scientific/technocratic organization, resource 
management, and anthropocentrism — which, during Dewey’s formative years as a thinker at 




Worster states that: 
 
There is no escaping the persistence of the past. Ecology in the late 
twentieth century is inevitably the product of its long and complex 
intellectual tradition. Failing to accept that indebtedness to the past, or to 
realize how diverse and contradictory that past has been, we will not make 
much headway toward a deep understanding of our current ideas about 
nature.82  
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It is precisely because they have helped to engender the cultural and historical context from which 
contemporary ecological ideas have emerged that these three schools of thought, the philosophers 
that represent them, and their successive places in the arcadian/imperial dialectic demand 
examination. Their worldviews, and views of nature integral to these worldviews, represent 
varied attempts to both delineate and reconcile arcadian and imperial visions within a larger 
conception of humanity and nature.  
The development of American philosophy as represented by these three thinkers appears to 
largely affirm Worster’s contention that the dialectical unfolding of arcadian and imperial 
concepts of nature reflects a trend in the evolution of American intellectual history, with the 
imperial vision finally becoming predominant in many ways. Emerson’s arcadian critique of 
instrumental science, his metaphysics of holism, his belief in transcendent meanings or ultimate 
purpose in nature, and his vision of human nature in harmony with the natural world was 
sustained but substantially mitigated in the philosophy of Royce. It was rejected in important 
respects by Dewey, who postulated instead a more imperial vision of instrumental science, a 
radically contingent metaphysics of nature, and a more problematic relationship between human 
interests and the natural environment, which involve a Darwinian dynamic of perpetual growth 
and struggle, offset by reconciliation. None of these philosophers is simplistically arcadian or 
imperial. However, Emerson, and to a lesser extent Royce, can be viewed as relatively more 
arcadian than Dewey in many respects, and the same might be said of the larger cultural milieu 
in which each did his thinking.  
Dewey’s philosophy is certainly not merely the “Baconian dream of maximum control over 
nature” as Richard Rorty claims in Consequences of Pragmatism.83 Nor is Dewey’s instrumentalism 
merely “a power philosophy,” as Bertrand Russell has stated.84 In fact, as previously illustrated, 
Dewey echoes a rather arcadian kind of harmony in orienting humanity within nature and 
lauding the value of possible aesthetic and religious experiences in the natural world. His 
pragmatism has certainly been read and interpreted in an arcadian light by an entire generation 
of “environmental pragmatists” and others — many of whom would argue, along with Dewey 
that it is actually the transcendentalists and idealists who seek to diminish and dominate the 
natural world by subordinating it to idealized abstract metaphysical constructs like “over-soul” 
and “absolute spirit.” It is pragmatism, its apologists claim, that truly valorizes nature by 
conceiving and experiencing it empirically and authentically in terms of its own dynamic 
processes. And we must learn from and adapt to these processes if we wish to maintain a 
meaningful life, since we are an integral part of nature.  
However, while Dewey claims that the flux of nature itself delimits and encompasses 
anything that can intelligibly or justifiably be known about it, Emerson and especially the earlier 
Royce counter-claim that the very limits of nature point beyond nature to an even more 
primordial Truth, which nonetheless expresses itself in the natural cosmic order in which it is 
realized. Thus, while Dewey’s concept of nature has no ultimate essence or stable ground and 
may therefore conceivably be configured and re-configured without limit, Emerson’s and Royce’s 
concept of nature rests on and emerges from an absolute ground that both sustains and requires 
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fidelity to the idea of a supreme — albeit mysterious — cosmic order which has an immutable 
essence and purpose . This in turn suggests that for Dewey “the natural world” is indeed 
“relatively malleable and plastic” and “may be used for this or for that” as utilitarian interests 
dictate, but for Emerson and Royce “we see the world piece by piece, as the sun, the moon, the 
animal, the tree, but the Whole, of which these are shining parts, is the Soul,”85 and this absolute 
World-Soul ensures a constancy and sanctity in nature that cannot be justifiably violated for 
utilitarian purposes. 
Unlike Emerson or Royce, who ground the flux of nature firmly on a sure foundation of 
ultimate cosmic meaning, Dewey renders the relation between nature and human nature 
radically contingent upon a dynamic interplay of struggle, reconciliation, and change mediated 
via “intelligence” or “growth” which is, itself, radically contingent. Emerson’s and Royce’s 
idealized absolutes, like the Over-soul and Absolute Spirit, may arguably entail unwieldy and 
overly idealized concepts of nature that risk separating human understanding and interests from 
real and vital involvement in the natural world, as Dewey contends. However, Dewey even more 
precariously postulates an idea of nature whose contingent holism seems to dissolve into vaguely 
shifting tautologies: “Nature” is defined in terms of organism-environment interaction, which is 
mediated by “intelligence,” which is understood in terms of “growth,” which emerges through 
“experience,” which is defined, again, in terms of nature. Human nature and the natural world 
are everywhere and always in the process of mutual redefinition and transformation, and the 
status of their relationship, indeed their very identity, remains an open question. 
This post-Darwinian ontology steers Dewey’s philosophy in a more imperial direction than 
that of Emerson or Royce. If, as Dewey claims: “Nature as it exists at a particular time is a 
challenge, rather than a completion; it provides possible starting points, rather than final ends,” 
then “[n]ature as it exists at a given time” is properly viewed as “material for the arts to be 
brought to bear upon it to reshape it, rather than as a finished work of art.” And for this purpose 
Dewey prescribes modern experimental science which is “an art of control.” He thus suggests 
that “Nature as it already exists ceases to be something which must be accepted and submitted 
to . . . It is now something to be intentionally controlled. It is material to act upon so as to transform 
it into new objects which better answer our needs.”86 
For Emerson and Royce, in contrast, the arcadian natural world has a transcendent order and 
an ultimate purpose. The human condition is sustained by this order and humankind’s place in 
nature is assured by this purpose. The role of human intelligence, science, and technology is to 
serve, rather than to shape, this order and purpose. In this arcadian sense, humanity seems more 
“at home” in the natural world for Emerson and Royce than it is for Dewey. For Emerson and 
Royce, humanity can and should find a kind of final harmonious (arcadian) quietism in the 
natural world and its purpose. For Dewey, such harmonious dimensions of experience seem to 
occur as temporary respites within a larger (more imperial) flux of perpetual challenge and 
struggle between the human organism and its natural environment, and final or transcendent 
purposes have no place in Dewey’s nature.  
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Worster’s thesis that the concept of nature in American thought has always involved a 
dialectical synthesis of arcadian and imperial attitudes through western history, with the imperial 
ultimately becoming predominant, would therefore appear to be fundamentally accurate 
(notwithstanding important qualifications in regard to specific thinkers, as noted). Certainly this 
dynamic can be seen in the development of American philosophical schools of thought regarding 
the metaphysics of nature as represented, in succession, by Emerson, Royce, and Dewey. 
Envisioning their legacy, and the larger forces that shaped and were shaped in part by them, as 
the confluence (rather than opposition) of diverse (and sometimes divergent) ideas, is perhaps 
the most accurate way to understand their contributions to the origins of environmental thought 
from the early nineteenth century through the Progressive Era . Ultimately, this understanding 
may also prove useful in assessing and appreciating the complexity of many current 
environmental debates and their origins. 
 
